

Conscription Threatens Hard-Won Achievements and Military Readiness

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

Throughout most of American history, our military has been composed of volunteers. However, conscription was the primary means of obtaining sufficient numbers of military personnel during World Wars I and II and the Korean Conflict, to the point that its renewal became perfunctory. In the late 1960s, President Richard Nixon established a commission to study how best to procure military manpower – retain the draft or institute a volunteer military. After much debate within the Administration, the Congress, and across the country, it was decided that an all-volunteer force was feasible, affordable, and would enhance the nation's security.² The debate concluded that, under a draft in which not all served, it was inequitable for some to bear the burden of military service while others could escape that responsibility by lot or by guile. Thus, the authority for conscription was allowed to lapse on July 1, 1973. The last conscript entered the Army on June 30 of that year.

All Volunteer Force -- Superior to Conscription...

The All Volunteer Force (AVF) has served the nation for more than a quarter century, providing a military that is experienced, smart, disciplined, and representative of America. Moreover, the AVF is more cost-effective than a conscripted force according to many studies, including an external review by the auditing arm of Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The AVF continues to exceed the expectations of its framers, and comprises the world's best military force.

More Experienced Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)...

Draftees quit early; volunteers stay – so today's mid-grade and senior noncommissioned officers are well-experienced. During the most recent draft, 90 percent of conscripts quit after their initial two-year hitch, whereas retention of volunteers is five-times better -- about half remain after their initial (normally four-year) military service obligation.

To put this in perspective: In 1968-69, a full two-thirds of the military was serving in its first two years of service, whereas today that number is about one-fourth. Owing to the high personnel turnover and low experience associated with the draft, Army Sergeants – often referred to as “shake and bake sergeants” – held fewer than two years experience upon promotion, whereas today their experience level is more than twice that – nearly five years.

² *Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*, Washington, DC (US Government Printing Office, February 1970). Heretofore referred to as the “Gates Commission.”

More Competent Performers...

Today's military is younger than the population as a whole, is more disciplined, and is more physically and morally fit. It is also smarter than the general population: over 90 percent of new recruits have a high school diploma while only 75 percent of American youth do; 67 percent score in the upper half of the enlistment (math/verbal aptitude) test. These attributes translate to lower attrition, faster training, and higher performance.

Research shows a very strong correlation between math-verbal aptitude scores and on-the-job task performance, as measured by hands-on performance tests across the range of occupations. In Figure 1 we show that relationship, which summarizes a multi-year Defense research project, the results of which have been validated by the National Academy of Science (NAS). For any aptitude level, gains in on-the-job performance are realized over time, with the lowest contribution made by the least experienced. Conscription – with its concentration of manpower in early years of service, guarantees an inefficient manpower investment.

Aptitude Predicts Performance




Figure 1

Further research, validated by the NAS, confirms that the most efficient investment of Defense dollars – even when considering the additional cost of recruiting higher aptitude youth – is realized when average recruit aptitude scores are between the 60th and 70th percentile. In contrast, conscription would converge toward the average (50th percentile), and a less efficient Federal investment.

More Efficient Investments...

The cost-effectiveness of an AVF has been reinforced by studies of the GAO, the private sector, and the Department. Virtually every review has concluded that, for a given level of force effectiveness, the AVF is less expensive than conscription. These conclusions are driven by three factors:³

1. With a conscripted force comes higher personnel turnover, which results in substantial costs. Shorter enlistment terms, characteristic of a draft, result in high personnel turnover and a degradation in unit stability and performance. Also, high turnover means more recruits, and more recruits mean more supervision and training; and more training means more trainers. As a result, an increasing proportion of military resources are diverted from core readiness missions to support for military training. Thus, training costs would be higher under conscription. Training can be fiercely expensive in a conscripted force because draftees who are assigned jobs requiring complex skills need longer time for training, which reduces the time available for performance in operational units.
2. Draftees also are less likely to reenlist. During the Vietnam era, only 10 percent of draftees elected to reenlist. Because of the typical pattern of individuals to serve only one short term, a conscripted force must be considerably larger than a volunteer force. Further, owing to the paucity of reenlistments, a draft force would be younger and less experienced, which has a chilling effect on job performance and personnel readiness.
3. With a volunteer military comes a more motivated force. Data show that people perform better if they are true volunteers than if they are coerced into military service. The recruitment of volunteers also has resulted in a higher quality force as measured by aptitude levels. This is noteworthy because a high aptitude force is more easily trained, performs better, and presents fewer disciplinary problems. Empirical evidence shows that a high quality and highly motivated force is more productive and less expensive in the long run.⁴

Quantification of costs in order to compare a conscripted force with a volunteer force is not a trivial exercise. However, analysts have concluded that, compared to an equally effective volunteer force, a draft would (1) reduce experience levels, (2) increase the percentage of both non-high school graduates and lower aptitude individuals, (3) increase accession levels, training loads, and force size, and (4) hike budget costs.

Specifically, the GAO in a 1988 study concluded that the AVF would be cheaper than a draft force, given a constant level of force effectiveness.⁵ According to the GAO, a volunteer force is less expensive than a draft by more than \$2.5 billion (over \$4 billion today).

But there are other costs in procuring military manpower under a draft. One such cost is the so-called “conscription tax,” defined as the earnings that a draftee forgoes by being conscripted into

³ Curtis Gilroy & W.S. Sellman, “Recruiting and the Economic Implications of an All-Volunteer Force, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2000, pp. 2-4.

⁴ Curtis Gilroy & W.S. Sellman, “Recruiting and Sustaining a Quality Army: A Review of the Evidence,” in Robert L. Phillips & Maxwell R. Thurman, ed., *Future Soldiers and the Quality Imperative* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995).

⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Military Draft: Potential Impacts and Other Issues*, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC, March 1988).

the military. This tax can be substantial because the military could pay draftees less than the going rate in the private sector. Like other hidden taxes, the draft does not reduce the true costs of obtaining recruits, it merely shifts the cost to the draftees. Thus, if the military pays \$10,000 to a draftee who could earn \$15,000 in a civilian job, the draftee must forgo \$5,000 of income. In effect, this draftee is paying a hidden tax of \$5,000 for each year of service.⁶

When a lower military entry wage is paid to draftees, the Services would have an incentive to "hire" too many individuals, instead of relying on more productive alternatives such as the use of more career personnel or complementary new capital equipment. When that rise in accessions takes place, the burden of national defense (in terms of the labor supply withdrawn from the economy) is greater under a draft than under a volunteer force. Hildebrand put it this way:

"[B]ecause military 'labor' is ... undervalued, the armed services are given a false signal by the price system; they are encouraged to use labor more intensively relative to capital than is justified by the real state of relative factor endowments in the economy as a whole. In consequence, it pays to hoard labor, to use it wastefully, and to adopt capital-to-labor ratios that are too low. Turnover rates are also made too high, and these add to recruitment costs while also lowering overall efficiency."⁷

Reduced Manpower for Smarter Weapon Systems...

The AVF has encouraged a far more conservative use of labor than would be the case with a conscripted force. The high-aptitude, high-experience AVF has encouraged the Department to leverage its weapons procurement in the direction of systems that are equally or more lethal, while requiring fewer (albeit smarter and more experienced) people. In other words, the systems have been designed and procured with the AVF in mind, and that design is not compatible with a conscripted force. For example, the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System replaces howitzer batteries and generates greater firepower with a crew size less than half that associated with the system it replaced. The demand for supervisors –and a higher experience profile – is essential. Similar trends are playing out across all Services. In the Navy, for example, Dunnigan reports:

"Over the last year, several ships have been fitted with more automated gear, and many remote sensors, so that one (trained and experienced) sailor can check the performance of multiple items of equipment without moving around a lot. A closer look at what a lot of sailors did resulted in a reorganization that eliminated a lot of chores and reorganized others to take less time. Improved communications, particularly shipboard access to the internet, made it possible for a lot of administrative jobs to be done ashore. As a result of this, several destroyers and cruisers had their crews cut by about twenty percent. This is important, as the proposed designs for new classes of warships call for even smaller crews. Many ship designers are urging crew sizes of a hundred or so sailors for destroyers and cruisers. Even carriers are looking to shed about a quarter of their 5,000 sailors and aviators.

"Crew size has been falling ... [d]uring World War II, destroyers tended to have over a hundred crew per thousand tons of displacement. Even without the current reforms, the crew size is now half what it was during World War II. In addition, the Navy was forced to pay close attention to smaller crew sizes in one class of ships; submarines. While modern subs are four times the size of their World War II counterparts, and full of much more equipment, crew size has only doubled."⁸

⁶ For a discussion of these and other cost issues, see Walter Oi, "The Economic Cost of the Draft," *American Economic Review*, May 1967, pp. 39-62. For a discussion of the conscription tax, see Charles B. Knapp, "A Human Capital Approach to the Burden of the Military Draft," *Journal of Human Resources*, Fall 1973, pp. 485-496.

⁷ George H. Hildebrand, "Discussion," *American Economic Review*, May 1967, pp. 63-66.

⁸ James Dunnigan, "The Incredible Shrinking Warship Crew," November 24, 2002.

This new generation of equipment replaces people with machines where possible, lowering overall system costs while placing a premium on training and experience of the high-quality crew. These are exactly the attributes of the AVF; they are not the attributes of a conscripted force.

American Society Still Invested...

Some argue that conscription is essential to ensure that Americans feel a direct impact across the full cultural and economic spectrum – thus are more sensitive to – the nation’s commitment to military operations. With the AVF, the military represents mainstream America in that it relies much more on the contributions of the Reserve Components than it has in the past. Reservists deploy in larger numbers with the active force.

Today, the Reserve Components serve as a bridge between national security policy and the will of the people. Coming out of the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams worked to make sure that the U.S. military would not again go into conflict without its citizen soldiers. The Persian Gulf War tested that concept, with all Reserve Components shouldering a large share of the mission, and performing that mission superbly. The Reserve Components continue to share in the military’s mission, including providing security at military installations, commanding peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, serving in Afghanistan, and preparing for contingencies in the Middle East and around the world.

This Reserve Component contribution serves to keep close bonds between the military and the civilian community. These reservists/guardsmen are construction workers, teachers, coaches, firemen, policemen, nurses, doctors, and lawyers in communities all across the nation. As Doug Bandow said in 1991, “The departure of reservists, who by and large have more political clout than the average 18-year old draftee, affects not only families and friends, but business associates, clients, and many others. For legislators and the president to carelessly send those people into war risks serious retaliation at the polls.”⁹

The AVF Reflects the Society it Protects...

The Gates Commission believed that sufficient numbers of qualified youth could be persuaded to volunteer by increasing military pay to levels competitive with civilian earnings. It disputed claims that reliance on volunteers would lead to a mercenary force consisting mainly of minorities, the poor, and the uneducated.

Notably, a Columbia University study reports that enlistees, “do not come from the more marginal groups on any of four dimensions: family socio-economic status, measured verbal and quantitative abilities, educational achievement, or work orientation.”¹⁰

⁸ Doug Bandow, *The Volunteer Military: Better than a Draft* (Washington, DC: The CATO Institute), January 8, 1991, p. 9.

¹⁰ Sue Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. 4.

**Black Proportion of NPS Active Component Enlisted Accessions
vs. Proportion of 18-24 Year Old Civilians**




Figure 2

The Commission also addressed a concern raised in some quarters about a volunteer force becoming “too black.” Believing these fears were really unfounded, the Commission recommended that policy makers accept whatever proportion of minorities the market dictated. Today, black recruits closely parallel their representation among the youth population (Figure 2). As with all AVF recruits, these young men and women are high school graduates with above-average aptitude; they are not the “poor and uneducated.”

Minority Representation in Selected Career Fields




Figure 3

Figure 3 depicts minority representation in selected career fields. Notably, Blacks tend to be concentrated in administrative and support jobs, not in combat jobs. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in a draft force. Blacks today account for 21 percent of the enlisted force, but make up only 15 percent of combat arms (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery). In contrast, Blacks account for 36 percent of Functional Support and Administration and 27 percent of Medical and Dental career fields.

Blacks choose military service as a viable and often more lucrative career than a “civilian” job. The military provides opportunities for training and education as well as job stability and security, and most important, supervisory responsibility. This is, after all, what an all volunteer military is about – volunteers making choices through decisions to join and remain in the military, and to select certain occupations, including those associated with combat or those that provide skills more readily transferable to the private sector.

It is noteworthy that casualty trends in Desert Storm were consistent with occupational patterns displayed in Figure 3. While Blacks accounted for 23 percent of military personnel deployed to the Gulf, they comprised only 17 percent of the combat or non-combat deaths. Whites, who made up 71 percent of the U.S. forces in the theater accounted for 76 percent of the deaths. Hispanics, who were four percent of the forces, accounted for four percent of the deaths; and others – less than two percent of the force – made up two percent of the deaths.

Conclusions...

**“We will not waver, we will not tire, we will not falter; and we will not fail.”
President George W. Bush, Oct 7, 2001**

The Gates Commission built a case for a volunteer military by pointing out the unfairness of conscription, establishing the feasibility of a volunteer force on economic grounds, and suggesting that a volunteer force could be more effective than a conscripted force.

The AVF has far exceeded the expectations of its framers. It has provided equal opportunities for young Americans to realize their potential and has demonstrated its superiority to a conscripted force by any reasonable measure. Not only has the All-Volunteer Force proved to be cost efficient; it is also combat-effective. The AVF has established a hard-earned record of success: from winning the cold war to restoring regional balance, to fighting non-state actors and being ready for an uncertain future. Americans oppose a return to conscription by nearly 3:1.¹¹

Today, more than 30 years later, we find that the Commission – and the Nation – got it right!

**“America will act deliberately; America will act decisively; and America will prevail because we've got the finest military in the world... We are ready. We're prepared. And should the United States be compelled to act, our troops will be acting in the finest traditions of America...”
President George W. Bush, Jan 3, 2002**

Attachments:

What Happens in a Draft?
Social Representation

¹¹ Gallup Poll, January 3-5, 2003.



What Happens in a Draft

Sequence of Events

Here is a brief overview of what would occur if the United States returned to a draft:

1. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZE A DRAFT

A crisis occurs which requires more troops than the volunteer military can supply. Congress passes and the President signs legislation which starts a draft.

2. THE LOTTERY

A lottery based on birthdays determines the order in which registered men are called up by Selective Service. The first to be called, in a sequence determined by the lottery, will be men whose 20th birthday falls during that year, followed, if needed, by those aged 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25. 18-year-olds and those turning 19 would probably would not be drafted.

3. ALL PARTS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE ARE ACTIVATED

The Agency activates and orders its State Directors and Reserve Forces Officers to report for duty.

4. PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND MORAL EVALUATION OF REGISTRANTS

Registrants with low lottery numbers are ordered to report for a physical, mental, and moral evaluation at a Military Entrance Processing Station to determine whether they are fit for military service. Once he is notified of the results of the evaluation, a registrant will be given 10 days to file a claim for exemption, postponement, or deferment.

5. LOCAL AND APPEAL BOARDS ACTIVATED AND INDUCTION NOTICES SENT

Local and Appeal Boards will process registrant claims. Those who pass the military evaluation will receive induction orders. An inductee will have 10 days to report to a local Military Entrance Processing Station for induction.

6. FIRST DRAFTEES ARE INDUCTED

According to current plans, Selective Service must deliver the first inductees to the military within 193 days from the onset of a crisis.

Source: Selective Service System (<http://www.sss.gov/seq.htm>)



Social Representation

Those most concerned with the social representation of the military typically focus on two areas:

- **The representation of African-Americans in the enlisted force:** Blacks comprise about 20% of non-prior service enlistees and 22% of the enlisted force, as compared to 12-14% of the civilians of comparable ages.
- **The representation of youth from affluent or upper-middle class households in the enlisted force:** Contrary to myth, data show that the enlisted force is quite representative of the civilian population. Although there are some differences, they are "... not dramatic."¹ Examination of data on socio-economic status with respect to parents' education, employment, and occupation show only modest differences between military enlisted accessions and the recruit-age civilian population.

The top-line percentages comparing the military and civilian populations with respect to three important socioeconomic indicators are remarkably similar.

- For educational achievement for the two groups, the percentages are very close (Table 1)
 - o 84% of DoD enlisted recruits and 86% of the recruit-age population have a father who is a high school graduate or higher
 - o 84% of DoD enlisted recruits and 85% of the recruit-age population have a mother who is a high school graduate or higher
- Considering employment rates, fathers of enlisted recruits and recruit-age civilian youth are nearly identical

Table 1: Education and Employment Rate of Parents of FY 99 NPS Recruits with Civilian Comparison Group

(Percent)	DoD Enlisted Recruits		Recruit-Age Population	
Highest Level of Education of Parents	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Less than High School Graduate	16	16	14	15
High School Graduate	32	35	31	35
Some College	30	31	25	28
College Graduate or Greater	22	19	30	22
Employment Rate of Parents	90	79	89	74

Source: Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1999, November 2000

Appendix B

¹ Robert Goldich, *The Military Draft and a Possible War with Iraq*, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, December 31, 2002, p. 13.

- Considering occupation, the distributions are also quite similar (Table 2)
 - o 5% of DoD enlisted recruits (active components) have fathers in clerical and administrative support jobs compared to 5% of those in the recruit-age civilian population
 - o 25% of DoD enlisted recruits (active component) have mothers in the clerical and administrative support jobs compared to 24% of those in the recruit-age civilian population
 - o 26% of DoD enlisted recruits (active component) have fathers in production and craft jobs compared to 21% of those in the recruit-age population.

Table 2: Occupation of Parents of FY 1999 NPS Recruits with Civilian Comparison Group						
(Percent)	Father			Mother		
Occupation of Recruits' Parents	Active Enlisted Recruits	Reserve Enlisted Recruits	Recruit-Age Population	Active Enlisted Recruits	Reserve Enlisted Recruits	Recruit-Age Population
Executive, Administration, & Managerial	16	14	20	13	13	14
Professional	9	11	14	16	19	19
Technicians & Related Services	4	3	3	4	4	4
Sales	8	8	10	11	10	10
Clerical & Administrative Support	5	4	5	25	23	24
Protective Services	5	5	3	1	1	1
Other Service Occupations	4	5	4	19	19	16
Farming, Forestry, & Fishing	3	4	4	1	1	1
Precision Production, Craft, & Repair	26	27	21	3	3	2
Machine Operators	6	4	7	4	4	5
Transportation	10	9	7	2	2	1
Handlers, Helpers, Laborers	3	3	3	1	1	2
Military	4	3	< 0.1	0.6	0.4	< 0.1

Source: Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1999, November 2000

- Although Defense Department data suggest that the socioeconomic status of military accessions is slightly lower than that of the population, African-Americans in the Active Duty military have notably higher household income than do their civilian counterparts (Table 3). African-Americans recognize the greater opportunity offered by service in the military, when comparing civilian labor market alternatives.

Table 3: Median Total Gross Household Income by Race & Ethnicity, 1999		
	Active Duty Personnel*	Civilian Population
White	\$33,480	\$44,400
African-American	\$32,004	\$27,900

Sources: DoD data from Overview of the 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, DMDC Report No. 2000-008 February 2001. Civilian data from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, September 2000. * Median interpolated from Table E.1 on page 375

- Beyond earning more than their civilian peers, blacks in the military are better educated, more likely to come from two-parent households, and come from families in which both mother and father are better educated.
- If we pursue social representation in the military in its purest form, Goldich argues that: "...the force should have fewer blacks, and more whites, and many more less-qualified individuals than the Armed Forces currently accept. Others have suggested that a logical outcome of this latter belief could be the imposition of racial quotas (penalizing capable minority youth who may enlist due to lack of perceived civilian opportunities), or forcing the military to turn away high-quality recruits to make room for less capable ones."²
- Another example of how today's volunteer force may be more broadly representative of the American population than some volunteer force opponents suggest involves the inclusion of officers in an analysis of the issue. Members of the middle and upper socioeconomic classes whose military functions are more analogous to civilian leadership positions are present in the officer corps, thus, it is argued, including officers in the analysis of socioeconomic status would reduce difference between military and civilian indicators considerably.³

² Goldich, p.14.

³ Goldich, pp. 13-14.

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									ARMY									
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-10	10	1	10	0	0	1	10	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-9	42	2	4.8	0	0	1	2.4	3	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-8	100	9	9	3	3	0	0	12	12	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-7	156	13	8.3	3	1.9	3	1.9	19	12.2	9	5.8	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	1	11.1
O-6	3,630	303	8.3	86	2.4	128	3.5	517	14.2	372	10.2	56	15.1	7	1.9	20	5.4	83	22.3
O-5	8,816	996	11.3	254	2.9	331	3.8	1,581	17.9	1,120	12.7	216	19.3	41	3.7	44	3.9	301	26.9
O-4	14,323	1,804	12.6	534	3.7	693	4.8	3,031	21.2	2,003	14	492	24.6	83	4.1	159	7.9	734	36.6
O-3	22,103	2,634	11.9	1,078	4.9	1,632	7.4	5,344	24.2	3,606	16.3	820	22.7	186	5.2	329	9.1	1,335	37
O-2	8,920	1,141	12.8	551	6.2	615	6.9	2,307	25.9	1,819	20.4	419	23	107	5.9	154	8.5	680	37.4
O-1	8,478	1,148	13.5	514	6.1	790	9.3	2,452	28.9	1,738	20.5	397	22.8	107	6.2	210	12.1	714	41.1
UNK.	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	66,583	8,051	12.1	3,023	4.5	4,194	6.3	15,268	22.9	10,669	16	2,401	22.5	531	5	916	8.6	3,848	36.1
WARRANT																			
W-5	419	53	12.6	16	3.8	16	3.8	85	20.3	9	2.1	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	1	11.1
W-4	1,424	191	13.4	58	4.1	62	4.4	311	21.8	41	2.9	13	31.7	1	2.4	2	4.9	16	39
W-3	3,398	505	14.9	186	5.5	157	4.6	848	25	221	6.5	78	35.3	16	7.2	12	5.4	106	48
W-2	4,447	847	19	248	5.6	242	5.4	1,337	30.1	400	9	182	45.5	25	6.3	23	5.8	230	57.5
W-1	2,091	342	16.4	115	5.5	137	6.6	594	28.4	155	7.4	64	41.3	5	3.2	12	7.7	81	52.3
UNK.	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	11,785	1,938	16.4	623	5.3	614	5.2	3,175	26.9	826	7	338	40.9	47	5.7	49	5.9	434	52.5
OFFICERS																			
TOTAL	78,368	9,989	12.7	3,646	4.7	4,808	6.1	18,443	23.5	11,495	14.7	2,739	23.8	578	5	965	8.4	4,282	37.3
ENLISTED																			
E-9	3,148	1,310	41.6	239	7.6	205	6.5	1,754	55.7	255	8.1	141	55.3	14	5.5	19	7.5	174	68.2
E-8	11,032	3,835	34.8	894	8.1	740	6.7	5,469	49.6	1,188	10.8	697	58.7	70	5.9	78	6.6	845	71.1
E-7	37,322	13,808	37	2,689	7.2	2,707	7.3	19,204	51.5	4,263	11.4	2,720	63.8	206	4.8	300	7	3,226	75.7
E-6	57,453	19,970	34.8	4,371	7.6	4,226	7.4	28,567	49.7	7,023	12.2	4,257	60.6	460	6.5	525	7.5	5,242	74.6
E-5	72,854	21,545	29.6	7,265	10	5,232	7.2	34,042	46.7	11,398	15.6	5,691	49.9	1,028	9	939	8.2	7,658	67.2
E-4	102,997	25,956	25.2	11,971	11.6	6,475	6.3	44,402	43.1	18,047	17.5	7,612	42.2	2,063	11.4	1,324	7.3	10,999	60.9
E-3	67,539	15,112	22.4	8,166	12.1	3,629	5.4	26,907	39.8	12,099	17.9	4,531	37.4	1,532	12.7	798	6.6	6,861	56.7
E-2	32,592	6,133	18.8	3,902	12	1,629	5	11,664	35.8	5,274	16.2	1,629	30.9	725	13.7	297	5.6	2,651	50.3
E-1	21,233	4,133	19.5	2,856	13.5	1,076	5.1	8,065	38	3,259	15.3	949	29.1	510	15.6	196	6	1,655	50.8
UNK.	13	1	7.7	1	7.7	0	0	2	15.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	406,183	111,803	27.5	42,354	10.4	25,919	6.4	180,076	44.3	62,806	15.5	28,227	44.9	6,608	10.5	4,476	7.1	39,311	62.6
GRAND																			
TOTAL	484,551	121,792	25.1	46,000	9.5	30,727	6.3	198,519	41	74,301	15.3	30,966	41.7	7,186	9.7	5,441	7.3	43,593	58.7

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									NAVY									
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-10	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-9	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-8	68	3	4.4	2	2.9	1	1.5	6	8.8	3	4.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-7	109	3	2.8	1	0.9	0	0	4	3.7	6	5.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-6	3,513	134	3.8	68	1.9	75	2.1	277	7.9	401	11.4	19	4.7	2	0.5	20	5	41	10.2
O-5	7,107	282	4	220	3.1	232	3.3	734	10.3	947	13.3	94	9.9	35	3.7	47	5	176	18.6
O-4	10,366	688	6.6	407	3.9	453	4.4	1,548	14.9	1,594	15.4	164	10.3	68	4.3	78	4.9	310	19.4
O-3	16,763	1,306	7.8	943	5.6	1,070	6.4	3,319	19.8	2,625	15.7	314	12	125	4.8	220	8.4	659	25.1
O-2	7,322	620	8.5	467	6.4	440	6	1,527	20.9	1,228	16.8	162	13.2	89	7.2	105	8.6	356	29
O-1	7,672	612	8	494	6.4	533	6.9	1,639	21.4	1,292	16.8	137	10.6	105	8.1	111	8.6	353	27.3
UNK.	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	52,961	3,648	6.9	2,602	4.9	2,804	5.3	9,054	17.1	8,097	15.3	890	11	424	5.2	581	7.2	1,895	23.4
WARRANT																			
W-5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W-4	413	56	13.6	12	2.9	35	8.5	103	24.9	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W-3	433	87	20.1	6	1.4	11	2.5	104	24	20	4.6	5	25	0	0	1	5	6	30
W-2	959	193	20.1	10	1	33	3.4	236	24.6	66	6.9	18	27.3	0	0	1	1.5	19	28.8
W-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	1,805	336	18.6	28	1.6	79	4.4	443	24.5	90	5	23	25.6	0	0	2	2.2	25	27.8
OFFICERS																			
TOTAL	54,766	3,984	7.3	2,630	4.8	2,883	5.3	9,497	17.3	8,187	14.9	913	11.2	424	5.2	583	7.1	1,920	23.5
ENLISTED																			
E-9	3,226	299	9.3	107	3.3	299	9.3	705	21.9	144	4.5	21	14.6	3	2.1	4	2.8	28	19.4
E-8	7,095	862	12.1	293	4.1	550	7.8	1,705	24	473	6.7	104	22	17	3.6	23	4.9	144	30.4
E-7	24,404	3,789	15.5	1,305	5.3	2,187	9	7,281	29.8	1,904	7.8	518	27.2	119	6.3	85	4.5	722	37.9
E-6	54,133	10,769	19.9	3,985	7.4	4,634	8.6	19,388	35.8	4,630	8.6	1,748	37.8	337	7.3	220	4.8	2,305	49.8
E-5	73,840	16,557	22.4	7,919	10.7	6,743	9.1	31,219	42.3	9,793	13.3	3,394	34.7	1,047	10.7	777	7.9	5,218	53.3
E-4	65,590	13,946	21.3	8,242	12.6	6,759	10.3	28,947	44.1	11,888	18.1	3,705	31.2	1,514	12.7	1,123	9.4	6,342	53.3
E-3	54,330	12,760	23.5	7,665	14.1	5,482	10.1	25,907	47.7	11,144	20.5	3,360	30.2	1,639	14.7	1,157	10.4	6,156	55.2
E-2	26,444	5,584	21.1	3,572	13.5	2,298	8.7	11,454	43.3	4,424	16.7	1,098	24.8	644	14.6	403	9.1	2,145	48.5
E-1	15,542	3,464	22.3	2,260	14.5	1,204	7.7	6,928	44.6	2,077	13.4	503	24.2	338	16.3	182	8.8	1,023	49.3
UNK.	87	13	14.9	9	10.3	0	0	22	25.3	13	14.9	3	23.1	1	7.7	0	0	4	30.8
TOTAL	324,691	68,043	21	35,357	10.9	30,156	9.3	133,556	41.1	46,490	14.3	14,454	31.1	5,659	12.2	3,974	8.5	24,087	51.8
GRAND TOTAL	379,457	72,027	19	37,987	10	33,039	8.7	143,053	37.7	54,677	14.4	15,367	28.1	6,083	11.1	4,557	8.3	26,007	47.6

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									MARINES										FEMALE								
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%									
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
O-10	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
O-9	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
O-8	24	3	12.5	1	4.2	0	0	4	16.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
O-7	39	3	7.7	0	0	0	0	3	7.7	1	2.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
O-6	622	30	4.8	17	2.7	6	1	53	8.5	19	3.1	1	5.3	1	5.3	0	0	2	10.5									
O-5	1,765	68	3.9	42	2.4	23	1.3	133	7.5	48	2.7	2	4.2	0	0	0	0	2	4.2									
O-4	3,421	204	6	125	3.7	103	3	432	12.6	78	2.3	13	16.7	2	2.6	4	5.1	19	24.4									
O-3	5,099	396	7.8	314	6.2	174	3.4	884	17.3	278	5.5	21	7.6	17	6.1	16	5.8	54	19.4									
O-2	3,067	211	6.9	229	7.5	147	4.8	587	19.1	249	8.1	28	11.2	24	9.6	22	8.8	74	29.7									
O-1	2,347	134	5.7	173	7.4	121	5.2	428	18.2	214	9.1	18	8.4	24	11.2	8	3.7	50	23.4									
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
TOTAL	16,402	1,049	6.4	901	5.5	574	3.5	2,524	15.4	887	5.4	83	9.4	68	7.7	50	5.6	201	22.7									
WARRANT																												
W-5	92	16	17.4	3	3.3	2	2.2	21	22.8	4	4.3	2	50	0	0	0	0	2	50									
W-4	212	26	12.3	9	4.2	2	0.9	37	17.5	14	6.6	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	1	7.1									
W-3	536	93	17.4	37	6.9	14	2.6	144	26.9	31	5.8	12	38.7	3	9.7	3	9.7	18	58.1									
W-2	814	135	16.6	71	8.7	19	2.3	225	27.6	49	6	17	34.7	6	12.2	1	2	24	49									
W-1	242	35	14.5	15	6.2	11	4.5	61	25.2	12	5	2	16.7	2	16.7	0	0	4	33.3									
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
TOTAL	1,896	305	16.1	135	7.1	48	2.5	488	25.7	110	5.8	34	30.9	11	10	4	3.6	49	44.5									
OFFICERS																												
TOTAL	18,298	1,354	7.4	1,036	5.7	622	3.4	3,012	16.5	997	5.4	117	11.7	79	7.9	54	5.4	250	25.1									
ENLISTED																												
E-9	1,361	451	33.1	132	9.7	46	3.4	629	46.2	42	3.1	11	26.2	3	7.1	3	7.1	17	40.5									
E-8	3,263	970	29.7	292	8.9	79	2.4	1,341	41.1	186	5.7	74	39.8	19	10.2	6	3.2	99	53.2									
E-7	8,847	2,236	25.3	768	8.7	250	2.8	3,254	36.8	438	5	147	33.6	52	11.9	16	3.7	215	49.1									
E-6	13,664	3,080	22.5	1,659	12.1	473	3.5	5,212	38.1	755	5.5	268	35.5	108	14.3	43	5.7	419	55.5									
E-5	22,864	3,892	17	3,615	15.8	992	4.3	8,499	37.2	1,497	6.5	365	24.4	275	18.4	99	6.6	739	49.4									
E-4	28,840	3,667	12.7	4,621	16	1,353	4.7	9,641	33.4	1,949	6.8	409	21	391	20.1	132	6.8	932	47.8									
E-3	43,930	5,624	12.8	6,618	15.1	1,966	4.5	14,208	32.3	2,740	6.2	507	18.5	505	18.4	151	5.5	1,163	42.4									
E-2	20,163	2,252	11.2	2,767	13.7	939	4.7	5,958	29.5	1,263	6.3	198	15.7	210	16.6	72	5.7	480	38									
E-1	12,667	1,427	11.3	1,684	13.3	517	4.1	3,628	28.6	589	4.6	98	16.6	96	16.3	35	5.9	229	38.9									
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0									
TOTAL	155,599	23,599	15.2	22,156	14.2	6,615	4.3	52,370	33.7	9,459	6.1	2,077	22	1,659	17.5	557	5.9	4,293	45.4									
GRAND																												
TOTAL	173,897	24,953	14.3	23,192	13.3	7,237	4.2	55,382	31.8	10,456	6	2,194	21	1,738	16.6	611	5.8	4,543	43.4									

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									A.F.	FEMALE									
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%		TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-10	13	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	1	7.7		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-9	38	2	5.3	0	0	0	0	2	5.3		1	2.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-8	85	2	2.4	0	0	1	1.2	3	3.5		2	2.4	1	50	0	0	0	1	50	
O-7	138	8	5.8	3	2.2	1	0.7	12	8.7		9	6.5	1	11.1	1	11.1	0	2	22.2	
O-6	3,770	197	5.2	70	1.9	83	2.2	350	9.3		399	10.6	31	7.8	12	3	15	58	14.5	
O-5	10,634	646	6.1	281	2.6	252	2.4	1,179	11.1		1,361	12.8	163	12	44	3.2	42	249	18.3	
O-4	15,596	929	6	375	2.4	510	3.3	1,814	11.6		2,365	15.2	308	13	61	2.6	119	5	488	20.6
O-3	22,636	1,558	6.9	639	2.8	982	4.3	3,179	14		4,558	20.1	601	13.2	110	2.4	242	5.3	953	20.9
O-2	8,627	661	7.7	260	3	369	4.3	1,290	15		1,872	21.7	254	13.6	50	2.7	88	4.7	392	20.9
O-1	10,149	794	7.8	372	3.7	471	4.6	1,637	16.1		2,219	21.9	281	12.7	86	3.9	125	5.6	492	22.2
UNK.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL WARRANT	71,687	4,798	6.7	2,000	2.8	2,669	3.7	9,467	13.2		12,786	17.8	1,640	12.8	364	2.8	631	4.9	2,635	20.6
W-5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
W-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
W-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
W-2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
W-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL OFFICERS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ENLISTED	71,687	4,798	6.7	2,000	2.8	2,669	3.7	9,467	13.2		12,786	17.8	1,640	12.8	364	2.8	631	4.9	2,635	20.6
E-9	2,922	514	17.6	122	4.2	86	2.9	722	24.7		352	12	86	24.4	13	3.7	14	4	113	32.1
E-8	5,770	1,135	19.7	204	3.5	185	3.2	1,524	26.4		653	11.3	189	28.9	23	3.5	25	3.8	237	36.3
E-7	31,616	6,482	20.5	1,181	3.7	1,015	3.2	8,678	27.4		3,339	10.6	1,129	33.8	97	2.9	125	3.7	1,351	40.5
E-6	44,882	8,599	19.2	1,893	4.2	1,390	3.1	11,882	26.5		5,946	13.2	1,899	31.9	208	3.5	200	3.4	2,307	38.8
E-5	73,205	12,418	17	4,425	6	2,950	4	19,793	27		15,373	21	4,159	27.1	1,020	6.6	753	4.9	5,932	38.6
E-4	51,438	9,523	18.5	4,179	8.1	2,426	4.7	16,128	31.4		12,305	23.9	3,348	27.2	1,048	8.5	676	5.5	5,072	41.2
E-3	53,878	9,605	17.8	3,630	6.7	2,285	4.2	15,520	28.8		12,607	23.4	3,319	26.3	943	7.5	657	5.2	4,919	39
E-2	12,922	2,380	18.4	794	6.1	683	5.3	3,857	29.8		3,680	28.5	929	25.2	237	6.4	219	6	1,385	37.6
E-1	15,675	2,303	14.7	1,163	7.4	776	5	4,242	27.1		3,654	23.3	727	19.9	314	8.6	224	6.1	1,265	34.6
UNK.	220	47	21.4	0	0	11	5	58	26.4		48	21.8	20	41.7	0	0	1	2.1	21	43.8
TOTAL GRAND	292,528	53,006	18.1	17,591	6	11,807	4	82,404	28.2		57,957	19.8	15,805	27.3	3,903	6.7	2,894	5	22,602	39
TOTAL	364,215	57,804	15.9	19,591	5.4	14,476	4	91,871	25.2		70,743	19.4	17,445	24.7	4,267	6	3,525	5	25,237	35.7

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									DOD	FEMALE									
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%		TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-10	35	2	5.7	0	0	1	2.9	3	8.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-9	124	4	3.2	0	0	1	0.8	5	4	2	1.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O-8	277	17	6.1	6	2.2	2	0.7	25	9	7	2.5	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	1	14.3	
O-7	442	27	6.1	7	1.6	4	0.9	38	8.6	25	5.7	2	8	1	4	0	0	3	12	
O-6	11,535	664	5.8	241	2.1	292	2.5	1,197	10.4	1,191	10.3	107	9	22	1.8	55	4.6	184	15.4	
O-5	28,322	1,992	7	797	2.8	838	3	3,627	12.8	3,476	12.3	475	13.7	120	3.5	133	3.8	728	20.9	
O-4	43,706	3,625	8.3	1,441	3.3	1,759	4	6,825	15.6	6,040	13.8	977	16.2	214	3.5	360	6	1,551	25.7	
O-3	66,601	5,894	8.8	2,974	4.5	3,858	5.8	12,726	19.1	11,067	16.6	1,756	15.9	438	4	807	7.3	3,001	27.1	
O-2	27,936	2,633	9.4	1,507	5.4	1,571	5.6	5,711	20.4	5,168	18.5	863	16.7	270	5.2	369	7.1	1,502	29.1	
O-1	28,646	2,688	9.4	1,553	5.4	1,915	6.7	6,156	21.5	5,463	19.1	833	15.2	322	5.9	454	8.3	1,609	29.5	
UNK.	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL WARRANT	207,633	17,546	8.5	8,526	4.1	10,241	4.9	36,313	17.5	32,439	15.6	5,014	15.5	1,387	4.3	2,178	6.7	8,579	26.4	
W-5	511	69	13.5	19	3.7	18	3.5	106	20.7	13	2.5	3	23.1	0	0	0	0	3	23.1	
W-4	2,049	273	13.3	79	3.9	99	4.8	451	22	59	2.9	14	23.7	1	1.7	2	3.4	17	28.8	
W-3	4,367	685	15.7	229	5.2	182	4.2	1,096	25.1	272	6.2	95	34.9	19	7	16	5.9	130	47.8	
W-2	6,220	1,175	18.9	329	5.3	294	4.7	1,798	28.9	515	8.3	217	42.1	31	6	25	4.9	273	53	
W-1	2,333	377	16.2	130	5.6	148	6.3	655	28.1	167	7.2	66	39.5	7	4.2	12	7.2	85	50.9	
UNK.	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL OFFICERS	15,486	2,579	16.7	786	5.1	741	4.8	4,106	26.5	1,026	6.6	395	38.5	58	5.7	55	5.4	508	49.5	
TOTAL ENLISTED	223,119	20,125	9	9,312	4.2	10,982	4.9	40,419	18.1	33,465	15	5,409	16.2	1,445	4.3	2,233	6.7	9,087	27.2	
E-9	10,657	2,574	24.2	600	5.6	636	6	3,810	35.8	793	7.4	259	32.7	33	4.2	40	5	332	41.9	
E-8	27,160	6,802	25	1,683	6.2	1,554	5.7	10,039	37	2,500	9.2	1,064	42.6	129	5.2	132	5.3	1,325	53	
E-7	102,189	26,315	25.8	5,943	5.8	6,159	6	38,417	37.6	9,944	9.7	4,514	45.4	474	4.8	526	5.3	5,514	55.5	
E-6	170,132	42,418	24.9	11,908	7	10,723	6.3	65,049	38.2	18,354	10.8	8,172	44.5	1,113	6.1	988	5.4	10,273	56	
E-5	242,763	54,412	22.4	23,224	9.6	15,917	6.6	93,553	38.5	38,061	15.7	13,609	35.8	3,370	8.9	2,568	6.7	19,547	51.4	
E-4	248,865	53,092	21.3	29,013	11.7	17,013	6.8	99,118	39.8	44,189	17.8	15,074	34.1	5,016	11.4	3,255	7.4	23,345	52.8	
E-3	219,677	43,101	19.6	26,079	11.9	13,362	6.1	82,542	37.6	38,590	17.6	11,717	30.4	4,619	12	2,763	7.2	19,099	49.5	
E-2	92,121	16,349	17.7	11,035	12	5,549	6	32,933	35.7	14,641	15.9	3,854	26.3	1,816	12.4	991	6.8	6,661	45.5	
E-1	65,117	11,327	17.4	7,963	12.2	3,573	5.5	22,863	35.1	9,579	14.7	2,277	23.8	1,258	13.1	637	6.6	4,172	43.6	
UNK.	320	61	19.1	10	3.1	11	3.4	82	25.6	61	19.1	23	37.7	1	1.6	1	1.6	25	41	
TOTAL GRAND	1,179,001	256,451	21.8	117,458	10	74,497	6.3	448,406	38	176,712	15	60,563	34.3	17,829	10.1	11,901	6.7	90,293	51.1	
TOTAL	1,402,120	276,576	19.7	126,770	9	85,479	6.1	488,825	34.9	210,177	15	65,972	31.4	19,274	9.2	14,134	6.7	99,380	47.3	

**DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE DUTY FORCES
BY SERVICE, SEX, AND ETHNIC GROUP
9/30/2002**

OFFICER	TOTAL									C.G.	FEMALE									
	TOTAL	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%		TOTAL	%	BLACK	%	HISP	%	OTHER UNK.	%	MINORITY TOTAL	%
O-11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-9	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-8	16	1	6.3	0	0	0	0	1	6.3		1	6.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-7	15	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	1	6.7		1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-6	336	9	2.7	4	1.2	3	0.9	16	4.8		12	3.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O-5	729	11	1.5	14	1.9	11	1.5	36	4.9		53	7.3	1	1.9	1	1.9	0	0	2	3.8
O-4	1,125	39	3.5	48	4.3	45	4	132	11.7		103	9.2	5	4.9	4	3.9	6	5.8	15	14.6
O-3	1,859	117	6.3	99	5.3	103	5.5	319	17.2		261	14	24	9.2	15	5.7	22	8.4	61	23.4
O-2	1,026	74	7.2	60	5.8	65	6.3	199	19.4		218	21.2	16	7.3	17	7.8	15	6.9	48	22
O-1	651	34	5.2	46	7.1	32	4.9	112	17.2		139	21.4	10	7.2	8	5.8	3	2.2	21	15.1
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	5,762	286	5	271	4.7	259	4.5	816	14.2		788	13.7	56	7.1	45	5.7	46	5.8	147	18.7
WARRANT																				
W-5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W-4	346	7	2	4	1.2	4	1.2	15	4.3		4	1.2	0	0	0	0	1	25	1	25
W-3	323	32	9.9	18	5.6	9	2.8	59	18.3		14	4.3	5	35.7	0	0	1	7.1	6	42.9
W-2	779	60	7.7	31	4	27	3.5	118	15.1		59	7.6	5	8.5	4	6.8	2	3.4	11	18.6
W-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNK.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFICERS	1,448	99	6.8	53	3.7	40	2.8	192	13.3		77	5.3	10	13	4	5.2	4	5.2	18	23.4
TOTAL ENLISTED	7,210	385	5.3	324	4.5	299	4.1	1,008	14		865	12	66	7.6	49	5.7	50	5.8	165	19.1
E-9	289	13	4.5	9	3.1	7	2.4	29	10		9	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E-8	567	30	5.3	13	2.3	15	2.6	58	10.2		28	4.9	4	14.3	0	0	0	0	4	14.3
E-7	2,838	217	7.6	132	4.7	78	2.7	427	15		175	6.2	39	22.3	5	2.9	6	3.4	50	28.6
E-6	5,485	418	7.6	383	7	255	4.6	1,056	19.3		432	7.9	82	19	30	6.9	24	5.6	136	31.5
E-5	6,033	430	7.1	505	8.4	373	6.2	1,308	21.7		677	11.2	90	13.3	53	7.8	54	8	197	29.1
E-4	7,076	289	4.1	547	7.7	326	4.6	1,162	16.4		770	10.9	43	5.6	50	6.5	49	6.4	142	18.4
E-3	5,090	235	4.6	377	7.4	207	4.1	819	16.1		611	12	39	6.4	46	7.5	31	5.1	116	19
E-2	2,017	86	4.3	138	6.8	63	3.1	287	14.2		202	10	15	7.4	10	5	13	6.4	38	18.8
E-1	567	21	3.7	53	9.3	12	2.1	86	15.2		67	11.8	2	3	5	7.5	3	4.5	10	14.9
UNK.	3	1	33.3	0	0	0	0	1	33.3		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	29,965	1,740	5.8	2,157	7.2	1,336	4.5	5,233	17.5		2,971	9.9	314	10.6	199	6.7	180	6.1	693	23.3
GRAND TOTAL	37,175	2,125	5.7	2,481	6.7	1,635	4.4	6,241	16.8		3,836	10.3	380	9.9	248	6.5	230	6	858	22.4